Canada’s Conservatives Are Now Homeless—They Must Fight Their Way Back In

The political conflict within Canada’s (mostly) two-party system may be bloody, but only through grit, solid arguments, and a universal appeal to conservative voters will the disaffected moderate class be brought back into the fold. Whoever can pull this off, after fighting the internal party base and elites, will be likely to win the next federal election, and revive the conservative movement for the next generation.

Pierre Poilievre speaks to a crowd in Kanata, Ontario on April 25th, 2019 (photo credit: Wikimedia Commons).

As with all articles discussing political parties and candidates, we welcome response pieces. — The Editors

Canada’s conservative tradition is long and rich. From John A. McDonald’s flawed but ultimately fruitful fight for a unified, federal Canada loyal to the British monarch to Borden’s liberal-minded revival in the early twentieth century, Canadian Conservatives have carved a unique path. Canadian conservatism, at its most robust, was compassionate but pragmatic, liberal but deeply loyal to church and state, and, in all cases, devoted to maintaining Canadian unity. It is an ideology and a party, at least historically, that has held distinctly Canadian institutions as sacrosanct, and kept the United States, Canada’s friendly but sometimes fickle partner, at an arm’s length. 

Beyond the aforementioned support for the British monarchy and Canadian federalism, these institutions included domestic free enterprise, economic protectionism, and the innate philosophies of the Anglo-Scottish Enlightenment (with requisite influence from France in Quebec). Canada would dutifully serve the British crown and its interests, but it would also chart a domestic course independent of British control. In this, they would fill the niche that their unruly neighbors to the south failed to.

Maintaining this lofty reputation has, however, been a challenge. Though John Diefenbaker’s tenure as prime minister (1957–1963) saw a few victories, such as eliminating racial discrimination in immigration and expanding voting rights to First Nations peoples, his poor decision-making almost totally destroyed Canadian conservatism as an institution. His abysmal relationship with the United States went far beyond the friendly distance of his predecessors, and was utterly inappropriate for the postwar environment. In the end, Diefenbaker did destroy the Progressive Conservative Party, though its bones would ultimately outlive him.

“The Liberals have abandoned all sense of fiscal responsibility, and the Conservatives have left Canada’s role in the world at the doorstep and traded policy debates for the culture war.”

Over the next few decades of Liberal dominance, Canadian Conservatives struggled to escape the Diefenbaker disaster. What would be their new identity? How could they adapt Canadian ideas, traditions, and institutions to a rapidly changing world?

For decades, Canadian conservatism had few answers to provide. The second half of the twentieth century was characterized by the Liberal ascendancy and futile fragmentation on the right.

But after sixty years without an official Conservative Party, Preston Manning, Stephen Harper, and Peter MacKay merged the Progressive Conservatives and the Reform Party (then called the Canadian Alliance), ushering in a renaissance of principled and pragmatic conservative politics that would see Stephen Harper serve as Prime Minister for nearly a decade starting in 2006. During most of these last two decades, the Conservatives had a few central principles, which they rarely deviated from: federalism, tradition, free enterprise, and support for Canadian values (including democracy and human rights) around the world. Sure, there were some deviations, but principles stood strong.  

This was outlined in the Party’s first policy manifesto, which stated, “We share over a billion dollars of cross-border trade every day. We also share basic democratic values.” It also added, “From time to time, Canada and the United States are, and should be, on opposite sides of trade or foreign policy issues. But the Canadian government must learn to disagree without being disagreeable.”

Fast-forward to the present: during US President Joe Biden’s last visit to Ottawa, now-leader Pierre Poilievre, aiming to throw red meat to his Biden-hating reactionary base, said, “We believe that opposition is an act of loyalty in our system.” The Conservative Party’s soul is dead, and Poilievre killed it.

Now, to hell with policy—it’s all about slogans and quips for social media.

Ditching a conservative message for fiery partisanship seems to be all the rage. If the election were to be held this Sunday, Poilievre would be set to win one of the largest electoral landslides in Canadian history. Yet he has no policy platform and no governing vision, beyond hating Trudeau and the Liberals.

After over two years as the leader of the opposition, Poilievre has yet to come out with a coherent policy vision. Instead of talking about the renewal of Canada’s role in the world, or ways to bring Canada back to the top of the G7, Poilievre spends his time planning his next relatable outfit, or his next media stunt—but did you see how nonchalantly he ate that apple, or how cool he looks without glasses? This is not conservatism.

In the last primary contest, voters were given a choice, and they chose to reject one of the most principled modern conservatives, veteran Erin O’Toole, and rejected all moderate options, instead embracing Poilievre’s hate-filled, vacuous campaign.

The main culprit, beyond Poilievre, is the lack of values in the Conservative base itself. Since its founding, the Conservative party, particularly its richest and most active members, have been pulling it towards the reactionary side of politics. When Harper became the first leader of the party in 2004, hardline voices in the party called for stricter nationalism, social conservatism, and extreme economic protectionism—far beyond the nineteenth century’s classical protectionism. Those positions, then, were completely out of line with the conservative movement and Canadian conservative philosophy, based on classical liberal and progressive conservative ideals. Political leaders, including Harper, may have tried to appease these voters at the conventions and behind closed doors, but still maintained a principled message on the national stage.

The new guard, however, has no care for this dichotomy. Most of them, like Poilievre, Candace Bergen, Andrew Scheer, and other “new guard” conservatives, have absolutely no relevant training or interest in conservative philosophy and values. They hate the Liberals, will do anything to win, and think that should be enough.

The party and the base’s full rejection of the candidacy of Erin O’Toole, a principled conservative with background in both government and military service, was the last nail in the coffin.

These reactionary forces have always been there, within the conservative base—only now, the Party has chosen to embrace their fear-based politics with open arms. Similar to the Republicans down south, moderate, principled conservatives willing to work within the system are now considered dinosaurs. The greater good, based on principles, policies, and values, has been swapped for the immediate, political good. Grifting has become the new name of the game.

Because of this seismic political shift within the Conservative party, genuine, principled, moderate conservatives are essentially homeless. The Liberals have abandoned all sense of fiscal responsibility, and the Conservatives have left Canada’s role in the world at the doorstep and traded policy debates for the culture war. Most are now faced with a gripping choice: be doomed to embrace the “lesser of two evils” every election cycle or attempt to retake control of the party from the inside, possibly handing over the election to the Liberals as a result, or, even worse, losing the official opposition spot in favour of leftwing parties.

Some strategists are opting out of the process altogether, deciding to fight the conservative battle from the outside by forming their own parties. This pattern has emerged repeatedly in the recent past, including with the Reform Party and Canadian Alliance after the failure of the Campbell era, the Maverick Party after growing frustration in the conservative base of the West and the Prairie, and more recently the Centre Ice Conservatives (now the Canada Future Party). 

While well-intentioned, these parties fail to grasp the harsh reality of Canada’s (mostly) two-party system and the need to fight the ideological and policy battle from within the trenches. The political conflict may be bloody, but only through grit, solid arguments, and a universal appeal to conservative voters will the disaffected moderate class be brought back into the fold. Whoever can pull this off, after fighting the internal party base and elites, will be likely to win the next federal election, and revive the conservative movement for the next generation.